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I. INTRODUCTION
Summary judgment, the acknowledged “workhorse” of federal 
pretrial practice,1 is again under scrutiny.  It certainly performs the 
yeoman-like task of sorting cases that deserve trial from those that do 
not and, hence, it can work to conserve scarce judicial and jury 
resources.2  To the extent that it identifies claims that are factually 
unsupported, it serves an important, indeed, vital role in the pretrial 
process.  Summary judgment has, however, become the subject of far-
reaching criticism, including assertions that judges too readily employ 
* Associate Professor, The University of Akron School of Law.  I thank Kyle S. Passmore and 
Bethany R. Hunt for research support. 
 1. EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE 1-2 (Thompson 3rd ed. 2006) (citing Robert K. Smits, Federal Summary Judgment:  The 
“New” Workhorse for an Overburdened Federal System, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 955 (1987)). 
 2. Edward J. Brunet, Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1165, 1167 
(2010). 
6-GENETIN_WESTERN_PINPOINTS CHANGED 10.18.10.DOCM 11/1/2010 10:16 AM 
1108 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:1107
summary judgment when issues of fact remain;3 that summary judgment 
violates the requirements of the Seventh Amendment;4 that the tool is 
used disparately in different geographical regions and in different types 
of cases5 and that such variation is played out with particularly harsh 
consequences for plaintiffs in employment and civil rights suits;6 that 
judges consider summary judgment motions in a mechanistic manner 
that often results in a “slice and dice” analysis or “legal and factual 
carving” that “sees less in the parts than in the whole by subjecting the 
nonmovant’s ‘evidence’ to piece-by-piece analysis”;7 and that the 
summary judgment process itself is inefficient.8
Current criticism of summary judgment practice, however, is, if not 
counterbalanced, at least met in some corners by calls for continued, but 
more tempered, use of summary judgment9 and even for increased use of 
summary judgment.10  Moreover, at the same time that commentators 
 3. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:  Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1065-69 (2003); Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1897, 1898 (1998); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy:  The 
Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 229 
(1993); Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 
YALE L.J. 73, 84, 89-90 (1990). 
 4. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 140-
45 (2007); Miller, supra note 3, at 1074-1132. 
 5. Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:  
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 592-93, 618 (2004). 
 6. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:  
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
517, 520, 548-50 (2010) [hereinafter Schneider, Disparate Impact] (citing Memorandum from Joe 
Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr. to Judge Michael Baylson 2-3 (Aug. 13, 2008), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/insumjre.pdf/$file/insumjre.pdf); Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
The Dangers of Summary Judgment:  Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV.
705, 709-11 (2007) [hereinafter Schneider, Dangers of Summary Judgment].  Further, Kevin M. 
Clermont and Stewart J. Schwab have concluded that plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases 
in federal court are treated less favorably than other plaintiffs in pretrial, trial, and appellate phases 
of litigation and that these plaintiffs are now filing fewer such cases in federal court.  See Kevin M. 
Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court:  From Bad 
to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131-32 (2009). 
 7. Burbank, supra note 5, at 624-25; McGinley, supra note 3, at 228-36; accord Schneider, 
supra note 6, at 544. 
 8. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522-
27 (2007); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror:  The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of 
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 172 
(1988). 
 9. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 2, at 1167-68. 
 10. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Dropping the Spear:  The Case for Enhanced Summary 
Judgment Prior to Class Certification, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1197, 1199-2000, 1202-03, 1241-44 
(2010); Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem:  
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004).   
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question seriously its implementation, summary judgment is 
contributing to the reinvention of other pretrial tools, most notably (but 
by no means only), the Rule 12(b)(6)11 motion to dismiss.12
Additionally, summary judgment has been the subject of recent 
rulemaking, both in the general restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and in a separate rulemaking project to improve Rule 56.13
Thus, the Section on Litigation of the Association of American Law 
Schools devoted its most recent Annual Meeting program to 
consideration of the future of summary judgment.  This symposium 
issue provides perspectives on emerging implementation strategies and 
roles for summary judgment.  The articles also reveal the tendency of 
changes in summary judgment law to emerge through interpretation, 
often of trial and appellate courts, rather than through intentional change 
of Rule 56 through the Rules Enabling Act process.   
Summary judgment has undergone multiple incarnations.  
Conceived in England and carried forward in early America as a tool 
that would primarily assist plaintiffs in terminating one-sided and 
undisputed cases before trial,14 summary judgment was intended to 
reduce “delay and expense resulting from frivolous defenses”15 and, 
thus, early served the efficiency and fairness premise of procedure.16
The original Federal Rules saw the birth of an expanded summary 
judgment device in Rule 56 that would be available to both plaintiffs and 
defendants,17 but would still serve to prevent the delay, expense, and 
inconvenience of proceeding through trial when one party proposed 
“sham claims or defenses.”18  Over the years, summary judgment 
received mixed reaction in the federal courts, with some judges using it 
aggressively and others approaching the grant of summary judgment 
based on a preview of the record with much more caution.19  The 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 12. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of 
Transsubstantive Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1189, 1189-92 (2010). 
 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 14. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 
423 (1929); Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary 
Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 91, 97 (2002); Burbank, supra
note 5, at 595; Burbank, supra note 12, at 1193.    
 15. See, e.g., Friedenthal and Gardner, supra note 14, at 97; Burbank, supra note 5, at 600-03. 
 16. Burbank, supra note 5, at 600-03; Burbank, supra note 12, at 1191. 
 17. Burbank, supra note 5, at 600-03. 
 18. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 97-98; Burbank, supra note 5, at 594-600. 
 19. See, e.g., Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 98.  
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Supreme Court, ultimately, through its 1986 trilogy,20 elevated summary 
judgment from a “disfavored procedural shortcut”21 to a position of 
pretrial prominence.  Indeed, summary judgment has been identified as 
the central element in federal pretrial practice:  “Summary judgment 
lurks over pleading, Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, rule 11, 
discovery, and mediation or dispute resolution if a case is diverted to a 
‘neutral third party,’ for the question is always what will happen on 
summary judgment.  It impacts and intertwines with every aspect of 
litigation. . . . The threat of summary judgment shapes settlement even in 
advance of a motion being filed. . . .”22  And defendants, of course, have 
come to use the summary judgment tool much more frequently than 
plaintiffs.23
Through this odyssey, summary judgment has evolved from a 
predominantly plaintiff’s side tool to be used in limited instances of 
clearly one-sided and undisputed cases to a pretrial weapon deployed 
most often by defendants and too often, in the view of some, to deprive a 
party of a right to trial when issues of fact may remain.24  In some 
respects, then, summary judgment has come to appear not so much as a 
workhorse employed in the task of efficient pretrial sorting, but as 
something of a Trojan horse that has been brought into the federal 
pretrial encampment and that is used to isolate factually insufficient 
claims, but that can be and is sometimes also deployed to deny trial on 
potentially meritorious claims, based on an early preview of the 
evidence. 
 20. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).  
 21. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 327.  This oft-quoted characterization of pre-trilogy treatment of 
summary judgment approaches hyperbole, as Professor Burbank points out that the available 
empirical data does not show a sharp increase in use of summary judgment following the Supreme 
Court’s 1986 trio of decisions.  Instead, Professor Burbank notes that the increased role of summary 
judgment began in the 1970s.  See Burbank, supra note 5, at 620-21; see also Stempel, supra note 8, 
at 159-60. 
 22. Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra note 6, at 539-40; see also Bronsteen, supra note 8, at 
523-24 (recognizing summary judgment as a “pillar of our system,” along with trial and settlement); 
Miller, supra note 3, at 1016 (noting that summary judgment has “moved to the center of the 
litigation stage”).  Professor Schneider perceives, however, that summary judgment may lose its 
central role to the revitalized Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under the plausibility standards of 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).  
Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra note 6, at 530-31, 539-40. 
 23. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1190; Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 103 (noting 
that defendants bring three-fourths of all motions for summary judgment and that defendants’ 
motions are granted more often than plaintiffs’ motions). 
 24. See, e.g., Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra note 6, at 542-44; Miller, supra note 3, at 
1065-69; Wald, supra note 3, at 1898; McGinley, supra note 3, at 229; Stempel, supra note 8, at 
159. 
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In this review of the evolving role of summary judgment, Professor 
Steven Gensler provides insight into whether Rule 56(c) give judges 
discretion to deny summary judgment even if the preconditions of Rule 
56(c) have been met, i.e., if there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
judgment as a matter of law could be entered,25 and Professor Edward 
Brunet engages directly the important debate regarding intemperate use 
of summary judgment to deny potentially meritorious claims, contending 
that currently available “safeguards” can prevent inappropriate grant of 
summary judgment.26  Professor Stephen Burbank and Professor Linda 
Mullenix enlarge the discussion to consider as well the impact of 
summary judgment on other aspects of the interconnected federal 
procedural system.  Professor Burbank explores the increasing doctrinal 
linking of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and summary judgment 
and the impact of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly27 and 
Iqbal28 on the future of rulemaking.29  Professor Mullenix evaluates the 
desirability of increasing the tasks assigned to the sturdy summary 
judgment workhorse, at least in the area of complex litigation, by 
including in the Federal Rules explicit authorization for courts to 
consider summary judgment on the named plaintiffs’ claims before class 
certification.30  Finally, Professor Jeffrey Cooper reviews diverging 
Supreme Court opinions to provide insight on whether, under the Erie
doctrine, Federal Rule 56 will continue to control in diversity cases.31
Pervading these discussions is the appropriate balance of use of 
summary judgment to further the efficiency canon of procedure and of 
the corresponding need to temper its use to ensure access and accuracy, 
or what Professor Spencer would refer to as the ongoing dialectic 
between the currently ascendant “restrictive ethos” in federal procedure 
and federal procedure’s core liberal ethos, which would privilege court 
access and accuracy over efficiency.32  A dominant subtext of the 
articles is the interplay between summary judgment and federal 
 25. Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1139 (2010).  This article was 
chosen for inclusion in the symposium from a Call for Papers issued by the Section on Litigation of 
the Association of American Law Schools.   
 26. Brunet, supra note 2, at 1168. 
 27. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
 28. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. 
 29. Burbank, supra note 12. 
 30. Mullenix, supra note 10. 
 31. Jeffrey O. Cooper, Summary Judgment in the Shadow of Erie, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1245 
(2010).  This article was chosen for inclusion in the symposium from a Call for Papers issued by the 
Section on Litigation of the Association of American Law Schools.   
 32. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
353, 353-57, 366-68 (2010). 
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rulemaking, including the impact on summary judgment of federal 
rulemaking, the effect of the transsubstantive assumption of the Rules 
Enabling Act, and the limits of the substantive rights prohibition of the 
Rules Enabling Act. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PRACTICE: IDENTIFYING THE STATUS QUO
AND ASSESSING STRATEGIES TO PREVENT IMPROVIDENT GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Articles by Professor Steven Gensler and Professor Edward Brunet 
address, respectively, recent rulemaking regarding summary judgment 
and the criticism that current implementation of summary judgment can 
lead to denial of the right to trial on meritorious claims.33  Professor 
Gensler explores the effect of recent rulemaking amendments on the 
debate regarding whether Rule 56 permits a measure of judicial 
discretion to deny summary judgment even when the record reveals, on 
undisputed facts, that judgment is appropriate as a matter of law.34  He 
concludes that although pending amendments to Rule 56 will eliminate 
express textual reference to the issue, those amendments do not 
eliminate judicial discretion to deny summary judgment, but, instead, 
maintain the level of discretion that was available before the restyling 
change to Rule 56.35  Professor Brunet’s article acknowledges the 
criticism that current implementation of summary judgment can result in 
dismissal of meritorious cases, but concludes that the efficiency gains 
associated with appropriate use of summary judgment justify attempts to 
remedy defects in current practice.36  He assesses available techniques to 
 33. Gensler, supra note 25; Brunet, supra note 2. 
 34. See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 104-09 (illustrating that, as a practical 
matter, judges do deny summary judgment in some cases in which the Rule 56 standard for 
summary judgment has been met). 
 35. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1142, 1160-62 & n.16.  Professor Gensler concentrates, in 
Must, Should, Shall, on the impact, if any, of rulemaking changes to Rule 56 on judicial discretion 
to deny summary judgment when summary judgment is otherwise applicable.  He concludes that 
two recent sets of rulemaking changes to the language of Rule 56 do not alter the judge’s discretion.  
He also concludes that, as a normative matter, judges should have discretion to deny summary 
judgment in at least some categories of cases, but he reserves his detailed discussion of those 
categories for a sequel to this article.  See Steven S. Gensler, In Defense of the Trial Court’s Limited 
Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment (forthcoming 2011).  Commentators, Jack Friedenthal and 
Joshua Gardner, have previously discussed a variety of circumstances in which courts have 
declined, as a discretionary matter, to grant summary judgment; they have staked out a view that 
summary judgment should be discretionary; and they have advocated inclusion of trial court 
discretion to deny summary judgment in the text of Rule 56.  See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 
14, at 95, 104-09, 125-30. 
 36. Brunet, supra note 2, at 1167-68. 
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avoid inappropriate grant of summary judgment, concluding that 
protections set forth in the text of Rule 56 are the most effective.37
Professor Gensler’s article, Must, Should, Shall,38 examines the 
Advisory Committee’s recent forays into the restyling and improvement 
of Rule 56 – efforts that were to leave the standard for summary 
judgment unchanged and unaddressed by Rule.39  He focuses on the 
short-lived textual change from language providing that summary 
judgment “shall be rendered” if the record reveals “no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law,” to language stating that summary judgment “should” be 
rendered if those conditions pertain, and back, again, to “shall.”40  The 
2007 change to include “should” originated in the Style Project,41 in 
which the inherently ambiguous “shall” was to be excised from all 
restyled Rules and replaced with “must,” “may,” or other appropriate 
and unambiguous language.42  The drafters of restyled Rule 56 settled on 
the use of “should” as a replacement for “shall” in Rule 56 with the 
expectation that “should” would continue the then-existing level of 
judicial discretion to deny summary judgment when the required Rule 56 
showing had been made.43
As part of a subsequent, separate rulemaking project to improve 
Rule 56, Professor Gensler notes, the Advisory Committee solicited 
comment on the restyling change from “shall” to “should.”44  It received 
 37. Id. at 190-91. 
 38. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1139. 
 39. The mission of the Style Project, which resulted in changing “shall” to “should,” was to 
retain the existing meaning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but to import clarity, 
consistency, and modern usage into the Rules.  See Gensler, supra note 25, at 1142-43 (citing 
Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1761, 1761-63, 1771-72, 1780 (2004)).  A subsequent rulemaking project, “the Rule 56 Project,” 
was initiated to resolve issues that had surfaced regarding Rule 56 during the Style Project, but that 
were outside the scope of that project, including variations between practice and the text of Rule 56.  
The Rule 56 Project, in contrast to the Style Project, had authority to address the standard for 
summary judgment, but the Advisory Committee elected not to do so.  See Gensler, supra note 25, 
at 1150-52. 
 40. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1139-41.   
 41. For a discussion of the Style Project, see Cooper, supra note 39; Gensler, supra note 25, at 
1142-43.   
 42. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1143-48. 
 43. Id. at 1147-48, 1160-631 (noting that when the Advisory Committee chose to use 
“should” in restyled Rule 56, they added, in an explanatory Committee Note, that such discretion 
should seldom be used, and concluding that restyled Rule 56 and the Advisory Committee Note 
together reflected the Committee’s belief that the language “shall be rendered” included limited 
discretion to deny summary judgment). 
 44. Id. at 1154-55.  The separate “Rule 56 Project” included a set of amendments intended to 
“improve” Rule 56, which pursued three primary goals:  (1) to establish uniform motion and 
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a substantial volume of comments, and those comments reflected 
significant disagreement,45 two factors that are sufficient to derail 
rulemaking changes, as the Rules Enabling Act process is currently 
implemented.46  Faced with substantial disagreement and lack of 
briefing procedures (ultimately referred to as the “point-counterpoint” amendment) that would 
require the moving party to file a statement of material facts that are not in dispute, the nonmoving 
party to respond to the statement of purportedly uncontested facts, and the movant to file a final 
submission; (2) to address explicitly in the Rule common practices nationwide that were not 
codified, such as the practice to permit partial summary judgment; and (3) to continue to permit the 
standard for summary judgment to be governed by judicial decision.  Id. at 1153.  Perhaps the most 
controversial of these amendments was the so-called “point-counterpoint” proposal, which would 
have included in Rule 56 detailed requirements for parties to assert, support, and contest the 
statements of fact offered in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion, and which 
the Advisory Committee ultimately abandoned.  See, e.g., Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra note 
6, at 521-22 & n.22, 542, 557-61. 
 45. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1155-57 (citing Preliminary Draft of Proposed Style Revision 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at xix-xx (Feb. 2005)).  Those favoring use of the term 
“must” emphasized, among other issues, the need for unequivocal and mandatory language to 
countermand a “persistent reluctance” of federal judges to grant summary judgment.  Those 
favoring continued use of “should” asserted, inter alia, that federal judges are, to the contrary, too 
quick to grant summary judgment.   
 46. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules:  The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 
OKLA. L. REV. 319, 326-27 (2008) [hereinafter Bone, Making Effective Rules] (noting that the 
Advisory Committee’s desire for consensus tends to push rulemakers toward highly general rules); 
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process:  Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and 
Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 916 (1999) [hereinafter Bone, Process of Making Process]
(noting that the search for consensus can paralyze rulemaking and suggesting that the likelihood of 
consensus on important procedural issues is slim); Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look 
at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1963-65, 2002-18 (2007) [hereinafter Bone, 
Who Decides?] (concluding that “delegating discretion allows rulemakers to dodge difficult 
questions and controversial normative choices by handing them to trial judges in individual cases, 
where they are less transparent and less likely to trigger public debate”); see also Panel Eight:  Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee Alumni Panel: The Process of Amending the Civil Rules, 73 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 135, 138 (2004) (Honorable John L. Carroll) (noting the “firestorm” over the potential 
amendments to the class action rule and concluding “[s]o I guess the thesis of all this is the Rules 
process is really consensus, and if you don't have a consensus, there is really no point in jumping 
into the Rules process as a vehicle for change”); but see Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to 
Revise:  That Is the Question, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 222-24 (2010) (indicating that at times the 
Advisory Committee will adopt “revolutionary” or “controversial” change in whole and at other 
times it will move incrementally).  Commentators have also, in the context of particular rulemaking, 
recognized that the Advisory Committee will abandon rulemaking in the face of controversy and 
absent consent.  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of 
Judgment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1608-
10 (2008) (discussing abandonment of successive, proposed changes to Rule 68 in response to 
firestorm of criticism and continuing controversy); Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural 
Change:  Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 228 (1997) (discussing effect of 
amendments to Rule 11, which ultimately became effective, on rulemaking power struggles); Linda 
S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience:  Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of 
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 852-55 (1991) (discussing the likely controversy regarding 
proposed revisions to Rule 11); Lester Brickman, Lawyers’ Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the 
Brave New World of Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY LAW & POL’Y REV. 243, 271-72 & 
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consensus on either “must” or “should,” the Advisory Committee 
resolved the disagreement by return to the original “shall,” concluding 
that the phrase “shall be entered” as used in Rule 56 had, through usage 
and interpretation, acquired a special meaning that could not be safely 
altered.47
Professor Gensler emphasizes that both the restyling change to 
“should” and the pending restoration of “shall” in Rule 56(c) were 
intended to maintain, rather than alter, the level of judicial discretion to 
deny summary judgment.48  Thus, after the Rule 56 language is returned 
to the original “shall be entered” on December 1, 2010, judges will have 
the same level of discretion as before the restyling of Rule 56.49  The 
trickier task is to define the pre-restyling level of judicial discretion, 
since neither the text of Rule 56 nor Supreme Court case law provides a 
definitive answer.  Commentators Friedenthal and Gardner have 
previously established that many courts, in fact, exercise discretion to 
deny summary judgment even when the requirements of Rule 56 have 
been met.50  They have also argued that trial courts should have this 
discretion in some cases.51  Professor Gensler will also conclude, in a 
sequel to Must, Should, Shall, that trial courts should have a limited 
discretion to deny summary judgment.52  That limited discretion to deny 
summary judgment when its grant would otherwise be appropriate 
would respond to some current criticisms of summary judgment: it 
would maintain and perhaps enhance the efficiency rationale of 
n.88 (2001) (noting “firestorm” touched off by proposed amendments to include settlement classes 
in Rule 23). 
 47. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1158-59; Kravitz, supra note 46, at 221.  
 48. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1160-62. 
 49. Id.
 50. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 95, 104-09 (noting that courts have exercised 
discretion to deny summary judgment in instances including cases involving (1) complicated facts, 
lengthy affidavits, and numerous depositions; (2) complex questions of first impression; (3) 
situations in which summary judgment would not expedite resolution of the case; and (4) 
inadequacies in the record); see also Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession 
Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 993-94 & n.145 (1998); Charles M. 
Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch:  An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J.  231, 275 (1990). 
51. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 95, 125-30.  Friedenthal and Gardner suggest a 
balancing test that would balance the interest of the plaintiff and defendant and the efficiency 
concerns of the court.  Id.  They advocate that a judge should consider factors, including whether 
the claim involves motive, state of mind, or credibility; the complexity of the issue; and whether 
issues ripe for summary judgment are intertwined with issues for which summary judgment is not 
appropriate, i.e., whether any summary judgment granted could ultimately be partial only.  The 
judge would have authority to deny summary judgment when the “matter is better suited to 
adjudication by trial rather than through summary judgment procedures.”  Id.
 52. Gensler, supra note 35.   
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summary judgment53 by permitting a judge to screen most claims for 
early dismissal whose outcome is fixed as a matter of law, but it would 
also provide a safety valve of judicial discretion to deny summary 
judgment when the benefits of reserving judgment until presentation of 
the merits at trial outweigh the cost and delay of waiting until trial.54
Moreover, inclusion of a limited discretion to deny summary judgment 
in the text of Rule 56 would provide needed guidance to the courts.55
The resolution of the “must, should” dispute by failing to decide the 
issue and by returning to the pre-restyling “shall,” however, presents in 
microcosm the rulemakers’ increasing tendency to abandon proposed 
procedural Rule change if amendment cannot be accomplished by 
consensus.56  In the Rule 56 project alone, Professor Gensler notes that 
rulemakers declined to consider including the standard for summary 
judgment in the Rule (in part because the rulemakers concluded that 
such an attempt would likely draw fire);57 abandoned the controversial 
“point-counterpoint” proposal for lack of consensus;58 and proposed 
return to the “shall be entered” language to obviate the need to resolve 
 53. Providing discretion to deny summary judgment may, in some cases, result in greater 
efficiency, and Friedenthal and Gardner propose that Rule 56 explicitly provide to judges the 
discretion to deny summary judgment when it would “be cost-efficient for both the parties and the 
court.”  Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 95, 115-16.   
 54. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 104. 
 55. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 95 (noting that “judges should be given 
guidelines for deciding when a denial of summary judgment would be appropriate”); see also
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure:  An Essay on Adjusting the 
“One-Size-Fits-All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 391 (2010) [hereinafter Subrin, 
Transsubstantive Procedure] (concluding that the “open-textured,” general rules adopted to meet 
the transsubstantive assumption of the Federal Rules give “little direction to judges and in turn, to 
lawyers”); Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 46, at 1963-65, 2002-18 (contending that rulemakers 
are in a better position to evaluate procedural options than trial judges in the context of individual 
cases, and rulemakers ought to craft Rules that provide more guidance to trial judges); Stephen N. 
Subrin, Reflections on the Twin Dreams of Simplified Procedure and Useful Empiricism, 35 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 173, 182 (2007) [hereinafter Subrin, Simplified Procedure]; Stephen B. Burbank, Of 
Rules and Discretion:  The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 693, 715 (1988) (emphasizing that the trend away from explicit policymaking in procedural 
Rules and toward Rules that permit ad hoc decisionmaking by trial judges sacrifice simplicity and 
predictability); Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative 
Context:  The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 679 (1997) (noting that the open-
textured Rules in the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules gave judges broad discretion over 
pretrial but led to criticism that such Rules prevented predictability and uniformity). 
 56. See, e.g., Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 46, at 916; see also generally 
supra note 46. 
 57. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1151-52 (discussing as well the 1992 abandonment, for lack of 
consensus, of attempts to revise Rule 56 to include, among other items, a restatement of the standard 
for summary judgment). 
 58. Id. at 1160; Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra note 6, at 556-62.   
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the “must, should” disagreement.59  Professor Bone has illustrated that 
the rulemakers seek consensus among competing interest groups, and, 
failing that, adopt general procedural Rules with vague standards that 
leave the “hard questions” to judges in the context of specific cases.60
Other commentators have, likewise, noted that procedural change under 
the Rules Enabling Act has come virtually to require consensus.61  In 
fact, Professor Mullenix, in her contribution to this symposium, 
proposes amending the Federal Rules explicitly to authorize summary 
judgment before certification of a class action, and she hastens to add 
that, at this point, Rule revision to authorize pre-certification summary 
judgment motions would “consist of little more than codification of 
existing practice.”62  Rulemakers also, as in the “must, should” context, 
choose to make no decision at all, which similarly privileges trial court 
discretion, and, in so doing, encourages procedural disuniformity.63
In short, the Rules Enabling Act process has come to work best 
when it codifies existing practice,64 makes stylistic changes that 
consciously avoid change to content,65 makes housekeeping or claims 
processing changes, as with the recent time computation amendments;66
or alters Rules in ways that can otherwise be reached by consensus.  
Failure to amend Rules, absent consensus, however, has far-reaching 
 59. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1158. 
 60. See, e.g., Bone, Making Effective Rules, supra note 46, at 326-27; Bone, Process of 
Making Process, supra note 46, at 916-17;  see also Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 46 at 1961-65. 
 61. See also generally supra note 46. 
 62. Mullenix, supra note 10, at 1242. 
 63. See Subrin, Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 55, at 391 (noting that the 
discretionary Federal Rules give little guidance to judges, thus, empowering different judges to treat 
similar cases differently and precluding uniformity); Burbank, supra note 55, at 715; Burbank & 
Silberman, supra note 55, at 675.  
 64. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 10, at 1212-14, 1246 (emphasizing that her proposal to 
provide authorization in the Federal Rules for summary judgment before class certification would 
amount to textual recognition of existing practice).  Additionally, Professor Gensler notes that one 
of the purposes of the Rule 56 project (which followed the Style Project) was to align the text of 
Rule 56 with “everyday summary-judgment practice.”  Gensler, supra note 25, at 1147-58, 1160-62. 
 65. Style Projects have been completed with respect to the Appellate Rules and Criminal 
Rules.  Cooper, supra note 39, at 1762 & n.3.  The restyled Appellate and Criminal Rules became 
effective on December 1, 1998, and December 1, 2002, respectively.  Id.  A restyling project 
regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence is proceeding.  For a comparison of the existing and the 
proposed restyled Federal Rules of Evidence, see http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed0809/EV_Rules.pdf. 
 66. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that were amended to make changes to computation of 
time are listed at the following site: http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/ 
FederalRulemaking/Overview/Rules120109.aspx.  A listing of parallel amendments to statutory 
time periods is available at the following site:  http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/HR1626.pdf. 
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consequences, both for the Rule at issue, here Rule 56, and for the 
federal rulemaking enterprise in general.  Failure to decide the “must, 
should”/judicial discretion issue by Rule amendment, for example, may 
contribute to the continued substantial variation in summary judgment 
practice in different parts of the country and in different types of cases,67
as it continues to authorize judges to make normative decisions, in the 
context of particular cases, about whether they have discretion to deny 
summary judgment when it is otherwise technically available, and, if so, 
when to exercise such discretion.  Additionally, the failure continues a 
trend of remitting procedural Rule change to ad hoc trial court 
decisionmaking in the context of individual cases, which presents the 
following downsides: the common law process is less democratic than 
the congressionally created Rules Enabling Act process; trial judges 
have less ability, in the context of specific cases, to gather the 
information regarding the competing views that is required to make 
optimal normative choices; and the general Rules adopted by the 
Advisory Committee will be transsubstantive in language only, but will 
result in varying application, at the discretion of trial judges.68  Of equal 
importance, Rule-based guidance regarding the circumstances under 
which trial courts may appropriately consider discretionary denial of 
summary judgment would provide guidance to appellate courts and 
enable appellate courts more effectively to review the discretionary 
district court decision, which would enhance the predictability and 
uniformity of summary judgment. 
 67. Burbank, supra note 5, at 592-93, 618; Burbank, supra note 55, at 715. 
 68. Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV.
535, 536, 543, 557 (2009) [hereinafter Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules”]; Robert G. Bone, 
Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 918 (2009); 
Subrin, Simplified Procedure, supra note 55, at 182; Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1473-75 (1987) [hereinafter Burbank, Costs of Complexity]; Bone, Who 
Decides?, supra note 46, at 1986-2001.  Moreover, we have recently learned, in our Twombly and 
Iqbal lessons, that making consensus an unstated prerequisite to amendment under the Rules 
Enabling Act process may ultimately mean (absent the infrequent Rule change by congressional 
legislation or implementation of a means for cooperative Court-congressional rulemaking in a 
particular instance) that controversial procedural Rule change may be accomplished only by the 
Supreme Court acting in its adjudicatory capacity.  Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra
at 562.  Rule change accomplished by Court interpretation, however, is inferior to Rules 
promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act process and for many of the same reasons that ad hoc 
trial court decision making is inferior: the Court, acting in its adjudicatory capacity, has less 
institutional ability to obtain sufficient information; less institutional authority to make prospective 
policy decisions; and no institutional capacity to make substantive decisions.  See, e.g., Burbank, 
Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra at 537, 561; Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra at 1473-75; 
Burbank, supra note 55, at 715-16; Bone, supra at 918. 
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A Rule-based conclusion that judges have discretion to deny 
summary judgment in some instances when summary judgment is 
technically warranted or that they have no such discretion – that is, 
Advisory Committee resolution of the “must, should” disagreement – 
would have led to greater uniformity in application of Rule 56 and much 
needed guidance to federal trial and appellate judges.  As Professor 
Gensler concludes, however, for now, the complex questions regarding 
whether Rule 56 confers discretion to deny summary judgment, and, if 
so, how much and in what circumstances, await further trial, appellate, 
and, perhaps, ultimately, Supreme Court consideration.69
In assessing currently available techniques to harness summary 
judgment, Professor Brunet concludes, in a similar vein, that inclusion of 
such techniques in the text of Rule 56 is essential to consistency of 
application and, thus, effectiveness.  In Six Summary Judgment 
Safeguards,70 Professor Brunet critiques six potential “safeguards” that 
may prevent inappropriate grants of summary judgment:  (1) judicial 
discretion to deny summary judgment based on a single issue of disputed 
fact; (2) the Rule 56(f) “time out” procedure that permits additional 
discovery before proceeding to summary judgment; (3) the requirement 
of de novo appellate review; (4) the requirement to weigh inferences in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party; (5) the potential ability 
of a nonmovant to provide contradictory evidence in inadmissible form; 
and (6) case law “cautions” against inappropriate use of summary 
judgment in particular categories of cases, including antitrust, 
negligence, and civil rights cases. 
Professor Brunet reminds that summary judgment, though under 
attack, advances important policies, including screening meritless cases; 
conserving expensive and scarce trial and jury resources; promoting and 
encouraging settlement; and promoting efficiency.71  Conceding that 
summary judgment may be misused, he nevertheless finds reason for 
optimism in summary judgment practice, emphasizing that existing 
protections can deter improper grants of summary judgment and 
facilitate its even-handed application.72  He would rank the identified 
safeguards on a scale of effectiveness, ranging from significant impact in 
deterring inappropriate grants of summary judgment to relative 
ineffectiveness in deterring misuse.  He ranks, as significant deterrents 
of inappropriate grants of summary judgment, two protections that find 
 69. Gensler, supra note 25, at 1163. 
 70. Brunet, supra note 2, at 1165. 
 71. Id. at 1167-68. 
 72. Id. at 1168, 1186-88. 
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textual support in Rule 56: judges, he emphasizes, regularly use their 
text-based authority to deny summary judgment when a single issue of 
material fact is in dispute,73 and they also have employed the Rule 56(f) 
“time out” procedure expansively to prevent premature grants of 
summary judgment.74
Professor Brunet, thus, provides a central insight: the protections 
that will be most effective in curbing inappropriate grants of summary 
judgment and encouraging greater uniformity in summary judgment 
practice are those that are included in the text of the Rule.75
Pragmatically, when the text of Rule 56 provides the shield against 
intemperate use of summary judgment, judges take heed.76
Indeed, Professor Brunet is less sanguine about the non-text-based 
willingness of some courts to extend the first safeguard – denial of 
summary judgment if there is a single, disputed issue of material fact – 
to circumstances in which summary judgment submissions reveal no 
genuine issue of material fact and that judgment may be entered as a 
matter of law.77  This is, of course, the “must, should”/judicial discretion 
dispute that Professor Gensler discusses and that the Advisory 
Committee declined to resolve.78  Friedenthal and Gardner have 
established that some courts (and, they contend, the majority of courts79)
do, in fact, employ discretionary denial of summary judgment in some 
 73. Id. at 1168-69, 1186, 1188. 
 74. Id. at 1177-79, 1187-88.  Professor Brunet cautions, however, that the currently effective 
Rule 56(f) time-out procedure may be weakened if courts respond to increasing proposals to 
institute a parallel “time-out” to permit discovery in Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice, in order to 
ameliorate the plausibility requirement of Twombly and Iqbal.  Brunet, supra note 2, at 1180.  See 
also Bone, supra note 68, at 932-35; Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting:  How 
Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 68-69, 108-09, 123-38 (2010); Edward A. Hartnett, Responding to 
Twombly and Iqbal:  Where Do We Go from Here?, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 24, 33-36 (2010), 
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin.htm.  
 75. Brunet, supra note 2, at 1169, 1178-79.  See also Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 46, at 
1964-65, 1967-70, 1986-2002 (making the case for Rule-based limits on judicial discretion, in the 
form of (1) eliminating unlimited discretion and replacing it, when possible, with “strict rules 
strictly enforced”; (2) narrowing options of trial judges, by providing factors to balance and weights 
respecting that balance; and (3) providing general principles to assist trial judges in making 
normative choices between competing values). 
 76. See, e.g., Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 46, at 1970 (emphasizing that current Rules put 
too little restraint on normative decisions of trial judges, but recognizing that the tradition of trial 
court discretion is so strong that trial judges will sometimes act contrary to clear limits imposed in 
Rules or case law).   
 77. Brunet, supra note 2, at 1169-70. 
 78. See supra notes 38-55 and accompanying text. 
 79. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 104, 125-26. 
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instances in which the parties’ submissions would justify its grant.80
Moreover, they argue that, given the current judicial receptivity to 
granting summary judgment, it is important that judges have discretion 
to deny summary judgment in some cases when it would otherwise be 
technically available,81 and they have proposed amending Rule 56 to 
reflect this discretion.82  They also conclude that a limited discretionary 
authority to deny summary judgment could serve both to prevent 
inappropriate grant of summary judgment and to enhance the efficiency 
of summary judgment.83  Given Professor Brunet’s conclusion that Rule-
based summary judgment safeguards are the most effective in preventing 
inappropriate denials of summary judgment, the Advisory Committee’s 
failure to resolve the “must, should”/judicial discretion debate looms as 
an opportunity lost. 
Professor Brunet would rank the availability of de novo review next 
in terms of effectiveness and of “moderate” effect in deterring 
inappropriate grants of summary judgment and would rank other, non-
Rule-based protections as of little effect.  He concludes that certainty of 
a nondeferential, second evaluation on appeal deters inappropriate grants 
of summary judgment.84  The deterrent effect of de novo review, 
however, is critical because, Professor Brunet observes, the effectiveness 
of de novo review as a safeguard is lessened by the expense of appellate 
review and the general impediments to reversing judgments on appeal.85
On the other hand, other protections not based in the text of Rule 56 – 
the common law requirement to weigh inferences in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party;86 the suggestion in dicta in Celotex 
Corp v. Catrett87 that evidence in opposition to summary judgment need 
not be in admissible form;88 and court-created cautions against unbridled 
 80. Id. at 104-09; see also Molot, supra note 50, at 993-94 & n.145.  
 81.  Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 95, 104, 125-29.  Friedenthal and Gardner 
propose that courts considering discretionary denial should consider factors, including whether the 
claim involves determinations of motive, credibility, or state of mind, or complex issues and 
whether issues ready for summary judgment are intertwined with issues for which summary 
judgment is not appropriate.  Id.
 82. Id. at 125-30. 
 83. Id. at 115-16, 125-26, 130.  In a companion article to Must, Should, Shall, Professor 
Gensler will also argue in favor of a limited discretion to deny summary judgment.  See Gensler, 
supra note 35. 
 84. Brunet, supra note 2, at 1182. 
 85. Id. at 1182-83. 
 86. Id. at 1180-82, 1188.   
 87. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 88. Brunet, supra note 2, at 1183-85, 1188. 
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use of summary judgment in particular categories of cases89 – afford 
little prospect for uniform judicial application in the trial or appellate 
courts for a variety of reasons.   
Both Professor Gensler and Professor Brunet reinforce the close 
relationship between the text of Rule 56 and summary judgment 
practice.  Amendments to Rule 56 and decisions not to amend the Rule 
will affect both summary judgment practice and uniformity of that 
practice.  Additionally, there is ample literature establishing that 
decisionmaking by the Advisory Committee is superior in many 
instances to permitting ad hoc trial court discretion90 and noting that, as 
an institutional matter, delegating normative decisionmaking to trial 
 89. Id. at 1171-77, 1188.  Brunet notes that court-created “cautions” against unbridled use of 
summary judgment in particular categories of cases, including antitrust cases, negligence cases, and 
civil rights cases, provide little more than slogans or exhortations that some courts will follow but 
others will ignore, in part, because these substance-specific “cautions” against inappropriate use 
lack textual support in Rule 56. Moreover, Professor Brunet points out that courts increasingly 
emphasize that substance-specific cautions contradict the transsubstantive assumption of the Federal 
Rules that procedural rules should apply uniformly across all subjects and regardless of case size. 
See, e.g., Subrin, Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 55, at 378 (noting that the term 
“transsubstantive” encompasses “use of the same procedural rules . . . for all civil law suits . . . 
regardless of the substantive law underlying the claims, or “case-type” transsubstantivity [,] and . . . 
regardless of the size of the litigation or the stakes involved, or “case-size” transsubstantivity”); 
accord David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Procedure,
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376-77 (2010).  Some of these case-specific “cautions,” however, such as 
the “handle with care” attitude of some, but by no means all, courts regarding civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases, actually reduce to concern with issues that may occur across all 
categories of cases (and, thus, do not implicate the transsubstantive assumption of the Federal 
Rules).  For example, case law cautions against use of summary judgment in civil rights and 
employment cases often focus on the appropriateness of resolution at summary judgment of issues 
of motive and/or credibility. Brunet, supra note 2, at 1175-77 (citing Allen v. Chicago Transit 
Auth., 317 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.)).  With this type of focus, the primary obstacle 
to effectiveness will be whether the issue arises to one that, as a normative matter, should prevent 
summary judgment, rather than the transsubstantive assumption of federal rulemaking.  Indeed, the 
issues of motive and/or intent in summary judgment are issues that Friedenthal and Gardner would 
include in amendments to Rule 56 regarding discretion to deny summary judgment when technically 
applicable. See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 14, at 126-28.  In other instances, however, such 
as cases espousing a “handle with care” philosophy regarding antitrust issues, the transsubstantive 
premise of the federal rulemaking may be in play.  But see Wald, supra note 3, at 1904 (stating that 
the “presumptively off-limits areas [for grant of summary judgment] included antitrust, patents, 
negligence, civil rights, and broadly conceived categories labeled ‘important public issues’ or 
‘complex cases,” primarily because such areas disproportionately involved questions of credibility, 
motive state of mind, and intent”) (quoting 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2729-2732.2, at 194-365 (2d ed. 1983) 
(emphasis added)). 
 90. See, e.g., Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 68, at 536, 543; Bone, Who
Decides?, supra note 46, at 2002-18. 
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judges in general, results in Federal Rules that are transsubstantive in 
language only, bury policy choices, and privilege judicial power.91
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN EVOLUTION: EMERGING ROLES FOR THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE
The contributors also discuss the relation of summary judgment to 
other aspects of pretrial practice.  Professor Burbank deepens the 
discussion by focusing on the recent doctrinal linking of summary 
judgment and motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  Professor 
Burbank also discusses the role that the transsubstantive assumption in 
federal rulemaking played in the Supreme Court’s much criticized 
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly92 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal93 and 
suggests that the case-made pleading changes ushered in by Twombly
and Iqbal may have illustrated the costs of transsubstantive procedure 
sufficiently to move Congress to abrogate those decisions94 and may also 
result in a cooperative Court-Congress rulemaking process for 
circumstances in which substance-specific Rules are required.95
Professor Mullenix explores another new role for summary judgment.  
She advocates amending the Federal Rules to authorize explicitly the use 
of summary judgment before class certification in class action cases.  
Professor Mullenix, moreover, suggests that the time has come to 
abandon the notion that summary judgment is inappropriate in complex 
cases.  Given the substantial costs in litigant and judicial resources 
exacted by complex litigation, Professor Mullenix concludes that the 
presumption ought, in some cases, to be reversed:  complex litigation is, 
instead, particularly suitable for adjudication by summary judgment.   
In Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of 
Transsubstantive Procedure,96 Professor Burbank illustrates that, 
through the Twombly97 and Iqbal98 decisions, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
and the summary judgment motion have been “assimilated 
 91. See, e.g., Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 68, at 536, 543, 557; 
Burbank, supra note 55, at 715-16; Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra note 68, at 1473-75; 
Subrin, Simplified Procedure, supra note 55, at 182; Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 46, at 1963-
65, 2002-18; Bone, supra note 68, at 918. 
 92. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 93. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 94. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1194. 
 95. Id. at  1194-95. 
 96. Id. at 1189. 
 97. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
 98. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. 
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doctrinally.”99  In the comparative portion of the piece, Professor 
Burbank draws parallels in the evolution of summary judgment and 
pleading practice and exposes critical differences in these pretrial 
devices that, until recently, had warranted different analytical treatment.  
Over its seventy-year history, summary judgment transformed from a 
device its drafters thought would be used principally by plaintiffs to 
parry sham defenses in debt collection cases to a device used primarily 
by defendants and used in the broad run of cases.100  Professor Burbank 
emphasizes that, throughout this transformation, the summary judgment 
tool remained faithful to its original purpose of screening from trial 
factually insufficient claims and preventing unnecessary cost and 
delay.101  By contrast, in two short years, Professor Burbank observes, 
the Supreme Court, through its opinions in Twombly and Iqbal,
conflated Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(e) motions,102 transformed the Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into another factual screening device – the 
“new summary judgment”103—and, in so doing, disregarded the historic 
role of Rule 12(b)(6) to test the legal sufficiency of claims under any set 
of facts.104
Professor Burbank also anticipates, based on the limited available 
empirical data, that the plausibility standard of Iqbal may result in 
criticisms that parallel the criticisms of summary judgment – varying 
rates of case termination in different parts of the country and in different 
types of cases105 and higher rates of dismissal in cases dealing with 
constitutional civil rights claims.106 Iqbal has already, with its 
invocation of “judicial experience and common sense,” introduced in the 
Rule 12(b)(6) context and before time for discovery, mechanical 
techniques of “inference carving” similar to the factual and legal carving 
of summary judgment that creates less in the parts than in the sum of the 
 99. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1189, 1191-92; accord Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra
note 6, at 518, 530-31, 536; Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion:  The Motion to 
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 16-17, 23-34 (2010); Lonny S. 
Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire:  What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can 
Teach Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1240-42 (2008).  
 100. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1189-90; Burbank, supra note 5, at 595-603. 
 101. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1191. 
 102. Id. at 1191-92. 
 103. Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra note 6, at 541; Thomas, supra note 99, at 16-17, 23-
34. 
 104. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1192. 
 105. Id. at 1190 n.9, 1193. 
 106. Id. at 1190, 1192-93 (citing Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly
and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 555-56, 603-08, 621-22 (2010)); see also
Schneider, Disparate Impact, supra note 6, at 532-36. 
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parts and that threatens both the right to trial and underlying substantive 
rights.107  And just as discovery is necessary before summary judgment, 
commentators are finding the solution to the Twombly/Iqbal invitation to 
“inference carving” based on “judicial experience and common sense” to 
be permitting discovery, here, limited or targeted discovery.108
Turning from the likely litigation impacts of Twombly and Iqbal,
Professor Burbank probes the potential depth of their rulemaking effects, 
suggesting that Twombly and Iqbal may impact federal rulemaking as 
deeply as the developing empirical research is likely to reveal their 
litigation impacts to be broad.  First, Professor Burbank emphasizes the 
Court’s disregard, in Twombly and Iqbal, of the Rules Enabling Act 
process for amending Federal Rules, a process the Court has consistently 
recognized as the sole procedure for Rule amendment.109  Second, 
Professor Burbank emphasizes the distinct possibility of congressional 
action to overturn the move to plausibility pleading.110  Third, he 
suggests that the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, the lower courts’ 
application of those decisions, and the developing empirical data may 
highlight sufficiently the costs of transsubstantive general rules to lead to 
a partial restructuring of the Rules Enabling Act process.111  Thus, 
 107. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1190-91, 1194 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 
(2009)); see also Bone, supra note 68, at 889-90. 
 108. See, e.g., Malveaux, supra note 74, at 68-69, 108-09, 123-38; Hartnett, supra note 74, at 
33-36; Bone, supra note 68, at 932-35.  As noted earlier, Professor Brunet suggests that the 
potential availability of a pre-12(b)(6) “time-out” for discovery may lessen the ability to obtain a 
Rule 56(f) “time-out.”  See Brunet, supra note 2, at 1180. 
 109. See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212-14 (2007); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 
815, 861 (1999); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); see also Burbank, 
supra note 12, at 1191;  Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 68, at 537, 549. 
 110. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009); Burbank, supra note 12, at 
1194.  See also Hartnett, supra note 74, at 24-33. 
 111. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1194-95.  Commentators have, for some time, suggested 
changing the Rules Enabling Act process or changing the types of Rules that are promulgated.  See, 
e.g., Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power:  The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1677, 1734-42 (2004) (calling for increased cooperation and consultation between Congress and the 
Court in rulemaking); Burbank, supra note 55, at 717-19; Subrin, Transsubstantive Procedure,
supra note 55, at 394-405 (suggesting transsubstantive procedure in the “case-type sense,” but not 
in the “case-size sense” that would permit a “simple” or “expedited” track for smaller cases and that 
would put limits on delay and discovery, while retaining current procedure for larger cases); Brooke 
D. Coleman, Recovering Access:  Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L.
REV. 261, 292-96 (2009) (suggesting changing the composition of the Advisory Committee to 
include a greater congressional presence; more balanced representation of judges, practitioners, and 
academics; and expanded experience by members); Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 46 (suggesting 
reduction of the current pervasive delegation of case-specific discretion to judges); Bone, Making 
Effective Rules, supra note 46, at 320, 328-40; Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm 
Found:  Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1234-36 
(1996).  
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Professor Burbank posits that, the ultimate rulemaking upshot of 
Twombly and Iqbal may be dramatic – legislative creation of a new 
procedural rulemaking process that permits federal rulemakers to 
propose substance-specific rules that will become effective only if 
enacted by Congress.112
In his essay, Professor Burbank reminds that Twombly and Iqbal
may not simply be ill-advised from a policy standpoint.113  Instead, 
rulemaking process matters.  The Court’s choice of Rule amendment by 
adjudication underscores the defects of a rulemaking process that has 
been construed to require transsubstantive,114 general rules for all 
situations, including those in which the problem at issue calls for a 
targeted and/or substance-specific solution,115 and particularly when that 
process has also come to require consensus.116  When the rulemaking 
process is viewed by the Court as ineffective for some categories of 
Rules and seeking congressional assistance is viewed as undesirable, the 
remaining option is Rule amendment by Court interpretation.117  Court 
rulemaking by adjudication, however, is a poor substitute for the Rules 
Enabling Act process because the Court must act within the bounds of 
interpretation in a particular case; Court access to information in the 
context of a particular case cannot replicate the broad-based information 
that can be obtained through the Rules Enabling Act process or by 
 112. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1194-95. 
 113. Id. at 1194-95.  See also Stephen B. Burbank, Time Out, in Plausible Denial:  Should 
Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 150-51, 152 
(2009); Bone, supra note 68, at 875-76, 898-935.  
 114. See, e.g., Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 68, at 541-43.  For a 
definition of “transsubstantive” procedure, see supra note 89. Professor Burbank has indicated that 
the initial Advisory Committee did not debate whether the Rules should be “transsubstantive,” in 
the sense that Rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act process would apply to all subject 
matter and all sizes of cases.  They did discuss and concluded that the Rules should be “uniform” 
and, thus, should apply geographically in all district courts.  They, thereafter assumed that the Rules 
would also be “transsubstantive.”  See, e.g., Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 68, 
at 541-42; Burbank, supra note 55, at 713-14 & n.140; see also Subrin, Transsubstantive 
Procedure, supra note 55, at 383-84.  Others have indicated that some current Federal Rules are, in 
fact, nontranssubstantive, see, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Procedure as Palimpsest, 158 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 421, 424-25 (2010), and, of course, Professor Burbank has long noted that the pervasive 
tendency of the Federal Rules to create “open-textured rules” that give judges broad discretion 
sacrifices uniformity and predictability and results in Rules that are “transsubstantive in only the 
most trivial sense.”  See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 55, at 715; Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra
note 68, at 1473-75. 
 115. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 68, at 879, 935-36. 
 116. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text. 
 117. Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 68, at 562. 
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Congress;118 and Court adjudication, which is less democratic and less 
participatory, is peculiarly inappropriate for resolving important issues 
of social policy.119  Simply put, the Court, in its adjudicative role lacks 
institutional capacity that it has when it acts through the Rules Enabling 
Act process, and it lacks the institutional authority to make broad 
decisions regarding social policy or, of course, substantive rights.120
Moreover, because of the assumption that the Rules Enabling Act 
requires transsubstantive rules that apply to all cases, regardless of size 
or subject matter,121 Professor Burbank has previously observed that, 
Court Rules, whether created through the Rules Enabling Act process or 
through Court adjudication, are often crafted to deal with the fairness 
and efficiency calculus of the complex case and then applied to smaller 
cases, which may price smaller cases out of federal court.122
Increasingly, however, the demand is for process that addresses 
separately the needs of complex and noncomplex cases.123
Indeed, Professor Mullenix takes aim directly at the complex case, 
proposing a Rule amendment that would affect complex litigation only.  
In Dropping the Spear: The Case for Enhanced Summary Judgment 
Prior to Class Certification,124  Professor Mullenix proposes amending 
the Federal Rules to authorize or require use of summary judgment 
before certification in class action cases and in other aggregate 
litigation.125  She recommends either a “weak-form” version of Rule 
amendment that would specifically authorize judges to consider 
summary judgment before class certification or a “strong-form” version 
that would require consideration of summary judgment before class 
certification.126  Professor Mullenix emphasizes that, at this point, Rule 
amendment to authorize summary judgment before class certification 
 118. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 113, at 150-51; Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,”
supra note 68, at 537, 559-60, 561.  
 119. Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 68, at 537, 559-60, 561; Bone, supra
note 68, at 918, 935-36. 
 120. Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 68, at 537, 559-61; Bone, supra note 
68, at 930. 
 121. Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 68, at 541-43. 
 122. Id. at 545, 562-63; see also Bone, supra note 68, at 931-35. 
 123. Burbank, Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 68, at 537-38, 542-43; Burbank, 
supra note 55, at 716-18; Subrin, Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 55, at 394, 398-400  
(advocating a “simple track” or “expedited track” for federal procedure, with restraints on delay and 
discovery, and emphasizing that there is no reason why the Federal Rules cannot exhibit “case-type” 
transsubstantive procedure, while abandoning “case-size” transsubstantivity); Bone, supra note 68, 
at 931-35. 
 124. Mullenix, supra note 10, at 1197. 
 125. Id. at 1199-02, 1242-43. 
 126. Id. at 1243. 
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would amount to codification of the status quo,127 as courts and 
commentators have concluded that pre-certification summary judgment 
is not only permissible, 128 but preferable in some cases.129
Nevertheless, Professor Mullenix recommends Rule amendment to 
articulate explicitly judicial authority to grant pre-certification summary 
judgment because it would provide judges with Rule-based, textual 
authority upon which to proceed.130  Here, Professor Mullenix echoes 
Professor Brunet’s observation, in Six Summary Judgment Safeguards,
that inclusion of guidance in the Federal Rules results in greater 
effectiveness, consistency, and uniformity.131  Inclusion of authority for 
pre-certification summary judgment in the Federal Rules would dispel 
notions of some judges that pre-certification summary judgment may 
not, or ought not, as a discretionary matter, be granted in class litigation; 
that the so-called “Eisen rule”132 precludes pre-certification summary 
judgment;133 or that complexity in itself should preclude use of summary 
judgment.134  Rule revision, thus, would signal that consideration of 
summary judgment before class certification is not simply appropriate, it 
may be preferable.135
In the bulk of the article, Professor Mullenix makes a compelling 
case for authorizing or requiring summary judgment on the named 
plaintiffs’ claims before addressing class certification issues.  Pre-
certification summary judgment, Professor Mullenix emphasizes, would 
serve efficiency and fairness by avoiding the high transaction costs 
associated with class actions, including the increasingly burdensome 
 127. Id. at 1242.  
 128. Id. at 1202-03, 1207-11 & n.53 (emphasizing that the Federal Judicial Center’s Managing 
Class Litigation:  A Pocket Guide for Judges now instructs that federal judges may rule on motions 
to dismiss and for summary judgment before class certification and, in fact, encourages pre-
certification ruling on dispositive motions as the “most efficient practice” and emphasizing as well 
that many courts in fact do rule on dispositive motions before class certification). 
 129. Id. at 1202-03, 1207-11. 
 130. Id. at 1201-03.   
 131. Id. at 1242-43; accord Subrin, Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 55, at 391. 
 132. Mullenix, supra note 10, at 1242.  The “Eisen rule,” which originated in Eisen v. Carlisle 
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974), is not implicated by the proposal for pre-certification 
summary judgment.  As Professor Mullenix explains, the Eisen rule is applicable when a judge 
evaluates whether to certify a class.  The proposal for pre-certification summary judgment, by 
contrast, is for summary judgment before the class certification process.  Thus, the Eisen rule is not 
at issue.  Id. at 1201, 1242.  Although some courts have previously applied the Eisen rule to pre-
certification dispositive motions, Professor Mullenix illustrates that courts have moved away from 
this interpretation, id. at 1212-15, and that commentators have also concluded that Eisen does not 
present a barrier to consideration of merits issues at the class certification stage.  Id. at 1230-33. 
 133. Id. at 1243. 
 134. Id.
 135. Id. at 1242-43.  
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costs of class certification under the heightened standards now imposed 
by appellate courts; it would ameliorate the settlement pressure 
associated with class action litigation; and it would narrow the debate 
over the extent and nature of permissible pre-certification merits 
discovery since discovery regarding the merits would be available in 
pre-certification summary judgment.136  Indeed, it would avoid class 
certification costs entirely if the defendant prevails on the pre-
certification motion for summary judgment (and no other plaintiff 
stepped forward to “pick up the spear dropped by the named 
plaintiff”137), and, conversely, it would render the incurring of 
certification costs meaningful if the plaintiff prevails at summary 
judgment.138  It would, in other words, put the horse firmly before the 
cart. 
Professor Mullenix underscores, as well, that this form of pre-
certification merits review is consonant with the efficiency and fairness 
rationale underlying other recent trends in federal litigation, including 
(1) the new plausibility pleading requirements introduced by the 
Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal;139 and (2) the move to 
significantly more rigorous class certification requirements in many 
circuits (which in some jurisdictions, newly requires courts to make 
“findings” by a preponderance that all Rule 23 requirements have been 
met, to resolve all factual and legal issues even if they overlap with the 
merits, and to  resolve conflicting expert testimony).140
Professor Mullenix emphasizes also the growing academic 
acceptance of merits review in the class action context, and she joins the 
conversation with a powerful suggestion for pre-certification merits 
review in the form of pre-certification summary judgment.  There ought, 
many have concluded, to be an early and meaningful review of the 
merits during class certification or, at least, before settlement of a class 
action.141  Pre-certification summary judgment moves the debate 
 136. Id. at 1200-01, 1203, 1217. 
 137. Id. at 1214-15 (quoting Cowen v. Bank United, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, 
J.)).
 138. Id. at 1201. 
 139. Id. at 1222-23. 
 140. Id. at 1224-29 (citing In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig, 552 F.3d 305, 316-23 (3d 
Cir. 2008)). 
 141. Id. at 1199-2000, 1229-35 (citing Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification 
and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251 (2002); Roy Alan Cohen & Thomas J. Coffey, 
Judicial Review of Class Certification Applications – The Compelling Case for a Merits-Based 
Gate-Keeper Analysis, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 257 (April 2009); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class 
Certification Based on the Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Kozel & Rosenberg, 
supra note 10; Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen:  Why the Class Action Analysis 
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regarding early review of the merits to a point before the class 
certification stage of the litigation and, thus, provides advantages 
unavailable at later stages:  It serves the efficiency and fairness functions 
of traditional summary judgment, but it does so at a time before the 
parties incur the tremendous costs now associated with the heightened 
rigor of class certification and with settlement pressure following 
certification.  It avoids the debate in each case regarding the amount of 
merits discovery to permit during class certification by making the 
merits the main event and permitting discovery sufficient to resolve the 
summary judgment motion.  It also coincides with the efficiency and 
fairness concerns underlying the Supreme Court’s pleading decisions in 
Twombly and Iqbal.  Further, this early form of merits review would end 
the case, if at all, only on the individual named plaintiffs’ claims, thus 
permitting others with viable claims to carry on the litigation as 
individual plaintiffs or as named plaintiffs.   
Of equal significance, Profess Mullenix’s suggested Rule revision 
proposes a timing change regarding summary judgment that is targeted 
specifically to address the issue of the meritless class action.  It would 
use summary judgment – early summary judgment, to be sure, but at 
least a process that permits discovery before case termination – to serve 
its traditional gatekeeping role.  It would recognize judges as capable of 
managing discovery relevant to the pre-certification summary judgment 
process, and it would recognize summary judgment both as capable of 
performing its traditional gatekeeping function and as sufficient to 
prevent the tremendous settlement pressure associated with class actions.  
Thus, Professor Mullenix’s proposed codification in the Federal Rules of 
the currently available pre-certification summary judgment has much to 
commend it. 
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: EVALUATING 
THE IMPACT OF SHADY GROVE
In Summary Judgment in the Shadow of Erie,142 Professor Cooper 
moves the discussion to the substantive rights prohibition of the Rules 
Enabling Act,143 and he questions whether the federal summary 
judgment standard – the cornerstone of federal pretrial practice – must 
Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366 (1966); Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of 
the Merits in Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51 (2004); Douglas M. Towns, Merit-
Based Class Action Certification:  Old Wine in a New Bottle, 78 VA. L. REV. 1001 (1992)). 
 142. Cooper, supra note 31. 
 143. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).  The substantive rights prohibition provides that Court-made 
Rules may “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”  Id.
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sometimes give way to state summary judgment standards in diversity 
actions.  He pairs the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Semtek 
International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.144 with its recent, divergent 
decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co.,145 in an effort to discern whether Federal Rule 56 will 
control in diversity actions when a state imposes a higher threshold for 
the grant of summary judgment than Rule 56.  Professor Cooper 
concludes that the Court’s recent, splintered decision in Shady Grove
makes application of Federal Rule 56 in diversity cases more likely, but 
the inability to garner a majority decision ensures continuing 
uncertainty.146
Before Shady Grove, there were increasingly worrisome arguments 
(from the perspective of the continuing uniform application of Federal 
Rules in federal diversity actions) that, whether analyzed as a conflict 
between Federal Rule and state law governed by the Rules Enabling 
Act147 or as an unguided Erie choice under the Rules of Decision Act,148
federal courts sitting in diversity might be constrained to use state 
summary judgment standards when that state procedure imposed higher 
standards for the grant of summary judgment.149  Professor Cooper notes 
that summary judgment practice in some states differs markedly from 
federal summary judgment practice.  In particular, some states do not 
follow the relaxed burden-shifting framework of Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett,150 which permits a defendant to make a “showing” that a 
plaintiff cannot establish an element of her case, and then requires the 
plaintiff to establish a genuine issue of material fact warranting trial 
through introduction of evidence, including affidavits, depositions, and 
answers to interrogatories.151  In those states, defendants shoulder a 
 144. 531 U.S. 497 (2001).  At issue in Semtek was whether the claim preclusive effect of a 
federal judgment dismissing a diversity action on statute-of-limitations grounds should be 
determined by the law of the state in which the federal court sits.  Id. at 499. 
 145. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 146. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1261-63; See Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of 
Shady Grove, forthcoming 2010, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633541 (concluding 
that Shady Grove “sapped . . . Semtek’s vitality as to Rule construction” and that Rule 56 should 
control after Shady Grove). 
 147. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 31, at 1151-52; Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie
Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 287-93 (2008). 
 148. Steinman, supra note 147, at 282-84, 297-301. 
 149. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1250, 1254-57; Steinman, supra note 147, at 282-84, 287-301. 
 150. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 151. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1247-49.  Professor Cooper illustrates as well that some states 
have not followed the lead of the Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), in 
which the Court, stating that the standards for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law 
6-GENETIN_WESTERN_PINPOINTS CHANGED 10.18.10.DOCM 11/1/2010 10:16 AM 
1132 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:1107
higher burden – sometimes a burden reminiscent of the pre-Celotex
burden in federal courts of offering sufficient evidence to defeat any 
reasonable inference in favor of the non-moving party – or plaintiffs 
bear a lighter burden in withstanding summary judgment.152
Moreover, similar arguments have surfaced regarding potential 
disuniform application of other Federal Rules in diversity actions, 
including pleading rules and class action requirements.153  In its recent 
decision in Shady Grove, the Supreme Court dealt directly with the 
application in a federal diversity action of New York’s statutory 
requirement in its Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) § 901(b) 
prohibiting, absent specific statutory authorization, class actions suits in 
cases seeking either a minimum recovery set by statute or statutory 
penalties.154  The Court’s fractured decision, however, reads as much 
like a debate about the continuing uniformity in diversity actions of 
Federal Rules in general as a decision about the applicability of New 
York’s CPLR § 901(b). 
Before its fractured decision in Shady Grove, the Court’s most 
recent discussion of Federal Rules and the Erie doctrine had been in 
Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.155  Professor 
Cooper emphasizes that the Semtek opinion provides significant 
opportunity for argument that Federal Rules that conflict with state law 
might be subject to Erie’s “twin aims” considerations of forum shopping 
and inequitable administration of the laws.156  This would, of course, 
vastly change the Rules Enabling Act analysis for conflicting Federal 
Rules and state law, as set forth in Hanna v. Plumer.157  It would also, 
Professor Cooper concludes, provide strong argument for application of 
state summary judgment standards in states with higher thresholds for 
the grant of summary judgment since plaintiffs would inevitably seek a 
state forum with a more forgiving summary judgment standard and 
defendants would virtually uniformly opt for the federal forum.158  More 
under Rule 50, are the same, required that federal courts use, at the summary judgment stage, the 
burden of persuasion that would exist at trial.  Cooper, supra note 31, at 1253-54.  Steinman, supra
note 147, at 278-83. 
 152. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1248-49; Steinman, supra note 147, at 278-79. 
 153. Steinman, supra note 147, at 285-87, 293-300. 
 154. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 901(b) (West 2006). 
 155. Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp, 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
 156. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1254-55. 
 157. 380 U.S. 460, 463-64, 469-74 (1965). 
 158. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1257; see also Steinman, supra note 147, at 283-84, 298-99 
(asserting that there are arguments for treating the summary judgment issue as presenting an 
unguided Erie choice and, if so construed, strong argument that the variation between federal and 
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broadly, as so construed, Professor Cooper concludes, Semtek would
“affect the continued viability of the Federal Rules . . . as a uniform set 
of procedural rules for lawsuits brought in federal courts.”159
Professor Cooper notes that courts and judges have virtually 
ignored the reading of Semtek that would incorporate the twin aims 
concerns into the analysis of conflicting Federal Rules and state law.160
The justices of the Supreme Court, however, seem to have been acutely 
aware of the potential for the dicta in the unanimous Semtek opinion to 
undermine the uniformity of the Federal Rules in diversity actions, and 
five of them, including Justice Scalia, who authored the unanimous 
Semtek opinion, took pains in Shady Grove to distance themselves from 
the dicta in Semtek that might import the “twin aims” analysis into 
resolution of conflicts between Federal Rules and state law.161  In fact, 
Professor Cooper comments that Justice Scalia, writing in Shady Grove
for a plurality, ignores Semtek’s suggestion that the twin aims 
considerations of forum shopping and inequitable administration of the 
laws might apply in the Rules Enabling Act analysis.162  In its stead, 
Justice Scalia would ask simply, as in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,163
whether a Federal Rule “really regulates procedure.”164  If so, it is valid, 
and it is valid in all states regardless of the nature or purpose of 
conflicting state law.165  But no opinion in Shady Grove could command 
a majority on all – or even most – issues.  Justice Stevens, who 
concurred in the judgment in Shady Grove, disagreed with the plurality’s 
state summary judgment standards would, when the state imposes higher standards for the grant of 
summary judgment, encourage forum shopping, in violation of the twin aims of Erie). 
 159. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1255. 
 160. Id.
 161. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1441 & n.7, 
1447-48 (2010) (Scalia, J., Opinion of the Court)  
We must acknowledge that [the plurality’s construction of the class action provision at 
issue] . . . will produce forum shopping.  That is unacceptable when it comes as the 
consequence of judge-made rules . . . .  But divergence from state law, with the attendant 
consequence of forum shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended) 
result of a uniform system of federal procedure. . . . The short of the matter is that a 
Federal Rule governing procedure is valid whether or not it alters the outcome of the 
case in a way that induces forum shopping.”); see also id. at 1449, 1456-57, 1458, 1459 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“The Rules Enabling Act 
does not invite federal courts to engage in the ‘relatively unguided Erie choice,’ . . . but 
instead instructs only that federal rules cannot ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right. 
Id. 
 162. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1261 & n.91. 
 163. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 
 164. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442-44 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 165. Id. at 1444 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
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conclusion that Federal Rules can be categorized as “procedural” or 
“substantive” without reference to the state law at issue.166  He would 
include, as part of a state’s definition of its substantive law – which 
would trump conflicting Federal Rules – state procedural law that 
“become[s] so bound up with the state-created right or remedy that it 
defines the scope of the substantive right or remedy.”167
So, what of the future of the federal standard for summary 
judgment in diversity actions, after Shady Grove?  Professor Cooper 
concludes that the possibility of state summary judgment procedure 
governing in diversity actions was always slight and, following Shady 
Grove, it is even slimmer.168  Those justices agreeing with Justice 
Scalia’s plurality opinion would most likely conclude that the summary 
judgment standard is “procedural” and, hence, valid and to be uniformly 
applied in federal diversity actions – it is part of the means of enforcing
the substantive rights, not a rewriting or alteration of substantive rights 
or remedies.169  Justice Stevens’s view on the uniform application of 
federal summary judgment procedure is not so clear.  He does admit the 
possibility of state procedural law so bound up with substantive rights 
and remedies that it forms part of the substantive state law and would 
overcome a conflicting Federal Rule,170 but he also emphasizes that state 
procedural rules that are sufficiently intertwined with substantive law 
that they must be considered part of the state’s substantive law for Erie
purposes will be rare.  Thus, Professor Cooper concludes that, although 
uniform application of Rule 56 in diversity actions is much more likely 
given the combined plurality and concurring opinions in Shady Grove,
the final answer remains uncertain.171
The uncertainty, however, does not end with summary judgment.  
As Professor Cooper has highlighted, at stake is the continued uniform 
application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity 
actions.172  The Court is reconsidering the application of its framework 
for conflicting Federal Rules and state law under Erie, and among the 
 166. Id. at 1449-50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 167. Id. at 1450, 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 168. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1261-63; see also Clermont, supra note 146, at 37-39. 
 169. Id. at 1261-62. 
 170. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1450, 1452 (Stevens. J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment).  Justice Stevens also acknowledges that the burdens of persuasion are substantive for 
Erie purpose.  Id. at 1450, 1453 & nn.8-9, and Professor Cooper notes that the summary judgment 
burdens of production are closely aligned with burdens of persuasion.  See Cooper, supra note 31, at 
1262-63 & n.103. 
 171. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1263; but see Clermont, supra note 146, at 37-39. 
 172. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1255. 
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potential candidates are the analysis set forth in Semtek and those in the 
plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Shady Grove.  In each 
of these analyses, the justices seem to agree on the general framework 
established in Hanna v. Plumer173 for determining whether a Federal 
Rule that is in potential conflict with state law will control under an Erie
analysis.  First, one asks whether the Federal Rule and state law 
conflict;174 if so, then there are two additional questions: (1) whether the 
Rule is rationally capable of classification as procedural; and (2) whether 
the Rule “abridge[s], enlarge[s] or modif[ies] any substantive right.”175
Professor Cooper illustrates that Semtek seems to define whether a Rule 
violates the substantive rights prohibition of the Rules Enabling Act (the 
requirement that a Rule not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive 
right) by reference to the twin concerns of Erie – whether the Rule 
would encourage forum shopping or inequitable administration of the 
laws.176  This construction of Semtek, of course, would maintain the 
current framework in name only and would dramatically transform the 
analysis of conflicting Federal Rules and state law.  It would provide an 
easily administered test (the “twin aims” concerns of whether a Federal 
Rule leads to forum shopping or inequitable administration of the laws), 
it would align the Rules Enabling Act and Rules of Decision Act 
analyses,177 and it would accord respect to state law, but it would also 
permit Federal Rules to be overcome by state procedural law more 
frequently.  As noted, at least five justices have taken steps in Shady 
Grove to distance themselves from any such analysis.178
 173. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64, 469-74 (1965). 
 174. The Court, Justice Ginsburg emphasizes, has used various formulations to describe a 
“conflict” between Federal Rule and state law:  it has stated that application of Hanna’s Federal 
Rules analysis requires a “direct collision” between a Federal Rule and state law; Shady Grove, 130 
S. Ct. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-
50 (1980) (quoting, in turn, Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472)), and that, “when fairly construed,” a Federal 
Rule must be “‘sufficiently broad’ . . . to “‘control the issue’ before the court, thereby leaving no
room for the operation of that law.”  Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Burlington N. R. Co. v. 
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987) (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50 & n.9) (emphasis added in 
Shady Grove))). 
 175. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437, 1442 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); Id. at 1450-52 
(Stevens, J, concurring); Id. at 1460-61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 176. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1254-55; see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
531 U.S. 497, 503-04 (2001). 
 177. See Cooper, supra note 31, at 1254-55 (noting that incorporating the twin concerns of Erie
into the Rules Enabling Act analysis, under the first prong of the Hanna v. Plumer framework, 
would made “a certain amount of historical sense” and that the question asked under the first prong 
of Hanna (under the Rules Enabling Act inquiry) bears a “a strong resemblance to the question 
under Hanna’s second prong, notwithstanding the Hanna Court’s insistence that the two inquiries 
are different”). 
 178. See supra note 161. 
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Each of the Shady Grove formulations hews more closely to the 
traditional Federal Rules analysis under Hanna v. Plumer,179 but would 
vary in the resulting uniformity of the Federal Rules, ease of judicial 
administration, and recognition of important state interests.  Justice 
Scalia’s approach for the Shady Grove plurality, would characterize a 
conflicting Federal Rule as either “procedural” or “substantive,” for 
purposes of whether it violates the substantive rights prohibition of the 
Rules Enabling Act, with little or no reference to the state law at issue.  
It would promote both uniformity of the Federal Rules and ease of 
judicial administration,180 but it would seem to return the federal courts 
to a previous position of failing to take substantive rights under the 
Rules Enabling Act seriously.181  Justice Stevens, in concurrence in 
Shady Grove, agrees that Congress intended to create a uniform system 
of Federal Rules, but contends that Congress itself, through the 
substantive rights prohibition of the Rules Enabling Act, requires that 
Federal Rules defer to state procedural law when the state law is 
sufficiently bound up with state-created rights and remedies.182  Thus, 
under Justice Stevens’s approach, a court must examine the content and 
purpose of state law to determine if the Federal Rule impermissibly 
impacts state substantive law, but Justice Stevens stresses that such 
instances will be rare.  Justice Stevens emphasizes also that both 
 179. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 464, 472.  
 180. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442-45 (Scalia, J, plurality opinion) (emphasizing (1) that 
only the substantive or procedure character of the Federal Rule is at issue, not the substantive or 
procedural nature of the state law; (2) that, if the Federal Rule regulates procedure, it is valid in all 
states and not valid in some and invalid in others, which would cause “chaos”; and (3) that this 
approach would avoid the “impracticability of a test that turned on the idiosyncrasies of state law”).  
 181. Compare Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s 
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1040-43 (1989) 
(suggesting that rulemakers do not abide by the substantive rights limitation in the Rules Enabling 
Act), with Burbank, supra note 111, at 1713-14, 1736 (observing, in 2004, that, over the past 
decade, Court rulemakers had exhibited “increased self-discipline” and that the rulemakers had “by 
and large, taken seriously the Chief Justice’s assurances to Congress that they would observe the 
Rules Enabling Act’s limitations”); Leslie M. Kelleher, Separation of Power and Delegations of 
Authority to Cancel Statutes in the Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 395, 442 (2000) (asserting that the Court has begun taking the “substantive rights 
limitations more seriously, particularly as a rule of construction, and to read Rules narrowly when 
necessary to avoid infirmity”). 
 182. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449-50, 1452-53 & nn.8, 13 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(concluding that the balance Congress has struck between uniformity of a Federal Rule and 
“sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies” requires consideration of the nature 
of the state law that may be displaced by a Federal Rule and that this “balance does not necessarily 
turn on whether the state law at issue takes the form of what is traditionally described as substantive 
or procedural,” but on whether the state law in question – whether procedural or not – “is part of a 
State’s framework of substantive rights or remedies”) (emphasis in Shady Grove)). 
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“respect for state construction of its own rights and remedies” and 
separation of powers concerns require this approach.183  This approach 
would purchase uniformity of Federal Rules in general (Federal Rules 
would “rarely” be found to impermissibly impact substantive rights184)
and respect for state substantive law, but at what Justice Scalia deems to 
be too high a price in difficulty of judicial administration.185  Justice 
Ginsburg, in dissent, suggests that greater attention should be paid to the 
initial question of whether the Federal Rule and state law are even in 
conflict and that the Court should continue its previous trend of 
construing Federal Rules to “avoid conflict with state laws” when 
significant state policies would be implicated and no countervailing 
federal interest is at stake.186  Justice Ginsburg’s approach would 
privilege the state’s interest, putting less emphasis on uniform 
application of Federal Rules in diversity and less emphasis on avoiding 
difficult interpretation of state law. 
Shady Grove reveals that the application of the Erie framework for 
conflicting Federal Rules and state law under the Hanna v. Plumer
framework is at a crossroads.  Five justices have backed away from the 
suggestion in Semtek that the Court might import the twin aims of Erie
concerns for forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws 
into the Federal Rules analysis.  In the plurality, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions in Shady Grove, the Court debates both whether 
Federal Rules should be read narrowly to avoid conflicts with state law 
when possible (thus, implicating the Rules of Decision Act analysis) and 
 183. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 184. Id. at 1454 & n.10, 1455 & n.13, 1457-58. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 185. Id. at 1445, 1447 & nn.14-15 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); but see id. at 1453-54 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the “difficult determinations” that Justice Scalia foresees with 
Justice Stevens’s approach are not necessarily “more taxing than Justice Scalia’s” approach and 
that, in any event, a preference for “easily administrable, bright-line rules . . . does not give . . . 
license to adopt a second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act”). 
 186. Id. at 1460-64 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (noting that “in [the Court’s] prior decisions in 
point, . . . [the Court has] avoided immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would trench 
on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest”).  Justice Stevens is not in 
general disagreement.  He concludes, in general, that when a Federal Rule “appears to abridge, 
enlarge, or modify a substantive right, federal courts must consider whether the rule can reasonably 
be interpreted to avoid that impermissible result.”  Id. at 1452, 1456 (citing Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp, 531 U.S. 497 (2001)) (Stevens, J., concurring), but he concludes that, on the 
facts at issue, any need to interpret Rule 23 narrowly to avoid violating the substantive rights 
prohibition of the Rules Enabling Act would be based on “extensive speculation” regarding the 
meaning of New York’s CPLR § 901(b).  Given that there are two “plausible competing narratives” 
regarding the meaning of CPLR § 901(b) and that the meaning based a plain textual reading would 
not violate the Rules Enabling Act, Justice Stevens concludes that there is no need to construe Rule 
23 narrowly to avoid a conflict with CPLR § 901(b).  Id. at 1456, 1459-60. 
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whether, in determining if a Federal Rule violates the substantive rights 
prohibition, the Court will consider the content and/or purpose of 
conflicting state law.  The Court reaches no definite conclusion on either 
issue, leaving the resolution of these important questions, for later cases.  
In short, there is much illumination in Shady Grove, but how the Court 
will ultimately apply its agreed-upon framework for resolving potential 
conflicts between Federal Rules and state law remains in the shadows. 
V. CONCLUSION
The contributors to this symposium on the Future of Summary 
Judgment provide insight into (1) interpretation of the amendments to 
Federal Rule 56 that are set to take effect on December 1, 2010; (2) 
emerging safeguards to prevent improvident grant of summary 
judgment; (3) the potential of summary judgment to impact interrelated 
aspects of the pretrial process, including the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
and class action litigation; and (4) the future of the federal standard for 
summary judgment in diversity cases.  Prominent in the articles is the 
authors’ recognition of the important influence of federal rulemaking 
and the Rules Enabling Act on the future of summary judgment.  The 
authors invite us to wrestle not only with the critical issues of the 
fairness and efficiency of summary judgment, but also with often buried 
issues of rulemaking, rulemaking process, and institutional capacity.  
They remind of the important practical impact – in terms of increased 
uniformity, predictability, and superior policymaking – of including 
specific guidance for trial judges in the text of the Federal Rules.  They 
explore the meaning of the substantive rights prohibition of the Rules 
Enabling Act, and they insist that we consider rulemaking process and 
institutional capacity in federal rulemaking. 
